Shirzad Peik Herfeh
Abstract
Good and evil are sometimes so dramatically meshed in each other that they face the person with an acute dilemma: on the one hand, his idleness and non-interference will cause enormous pain and, on the other, his interference for relieving or ending a pain will itself involve causing another pain–even ...
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Good and evil are sometimes so dramatically meshed in each other that they face the person with an acute dilemma: on the one hand, his idleness and non-interference will cause enormous pain and, on the other, his interference for relieving or ending a pain will itself involve causing another pain–even though a far less enormous one than the former. The solution always offered by consequentialists is the rule of ‘the most pleasure for the greatest number’. They argue based on this rule that humans are always permitted and even obliged to inflict pain in order to reduce the total pain in terms of both quality and quantity. This solution, at least in its maximalist form, contradicts our moral intuitions and established judgements. However, the idleness which is the result of opposing consequentialism and subscribing unconditionally and wholeheartedly to certain absolute, unalterable constraints will, in cases where not inflicting a slight pain will cause acute, burning pain, be similarly destructive and does not conform to our moral intuitions and established judgements, either. Therefore, in such cases where no third option can be found, non-consequentialists have used the ‘double-effect reasoning’ to prevent the greater of two harms. After introducing the main intellectual sources of the ‘double-effect reasoning’ in Thomas Aquinas’ views and explaining its newer readings in views of French Jesuit Jean Pierre Gury, Joseph Mingen and in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, the present paper endeavours to analyse, scrutiny and reformulate the argument’s four conditions in order to provide a newer, more precise and simpler reading of it, demonstrating one of its important consequences in pragmatic ethics.
amir nasri
Abstract
Pseudo-Dionysius's view on evil was influenced by Neoplatonic tradition. Like Neoplatonic philosophers, he believed evil to be the absence of good and of no actual existence as all creatures were good and shared this quality. In other words, things lacking good would have no existence at all. Accordingly, ...
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Pseudo-Dionysius's view on evil was influenced by Neoplatonic tradition. Like Neoplatonic philosophers, he believed evil to be the absence of good and of no actual existence as all creatures were good and shared this quality. In other words, things lacking good would have no existence at all. Accordingly, Pseudo-Dionysius defined evil as lack of perfection and related it to the descent of the soul or the fall of man. In his view on evil, Pseudo-Dionysius was mostly influenced by Proclus, with whom he shared the belief that matter should not be considered evil, a view which stood in opposition with those of Plotinus. Furthermore, He was more concerned with philosophical issues than theological ones. Therefore, his views are penned in a language borrowed form Neoplatonic philosophers which bears little resemblance to the rhetoric of the Holy Scriptures.
hasan miandari
Abstract
The "logical problem of evil" is one kind of the "problem of evil." It is claimed that there is a logical inconsistency between belief in the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God and belief in the existence of evil. Alvin Plantinga argued by his "free will defense" that they are ...
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The "logical problem of evil" is one kind of the "problem of evil." It is claimed that there is a logical inconsistency between belief in the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God and belief in the existence of evil. Alvin Plantinga argued by his "free will defense" that they are consistent. In this paper I present his argument. Then three objections against his argument are mentioned. They are based on compatibilism, God's omnipotence, and God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Plantinga's responses to these come next. They are based on a counterexample, Leibniz's lapse, and transworld depravity. It is nearly accepted by all parties that Plantinga's defense is successful. Now the problem is the evidential one. For this problem to be solved, there must be a theodicy. And Plantinga gives one. But this is not successful at all. Muslims have to pay attention to this neglected area.
