philosophy
Seyed Amir Ali Mousavian
Abstract
The inappropriate use of "cause" in the translation of Aition and transferring the conceptual and metaphysical content of active cause to other causes, especially the ultimate cause, has caused misinterpretations and misunderstanding of this concept. If the relationship between cause and explanation ...
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The inappropriate use of "cause" in the translation of Aition and transferring the conceptual and metaphysical content of active cause to other causes, especially the ultimate cause, has caused misinterpretations and misunderstanding of this concept. If the relationship between cause and explanation is not taken into account, there will be confusion between the meaning of cause in the new philosophy and Aitia, which is caused by not taking into account the difference between "view to fact" and the mind, or the distinction between proof and evidence. In this article, the why and how to enumerate the Aristotelian causes and the ontological and epistemological strains of the relationship between cause and explanation are discussed from his point of view. The reason for Aristotle's fourfold classification of causes and the understanding of the causal relationship should be found based on the category of change and movement or the relationship between the creator and the artifact. The role of change and movement can be considered as the foundation of the natural analysis of causality based on the teachings of physics and metaphysics, in parallel with Aristotle's theory of causality in secondary analyzes based on the concepts of the middle ground of evidential analogy and general causal innateness. It is possible to consider the cause as a type of explanation or as a part of the explanation known as the causal explanation in such a way that it is both an explanation and an explanation of the cause.
Seyed Ali Kalantari; Meghdad Ghari
Abstract
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, ...
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On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, in this paper concerns the explanatory role of the truth norm of belief with regard to the norm of evidence, according to which "one ought to (believe that p) iff evidence supports its truth"; we will call the latter norm, the narrow-scope norm of evidence. On the basis of the idea, evidence is not independently valuable, but their normativity pro producing beliefs depends on the truth norm of belief. In another words, as evidence typically point toward truth and that, according to the truth norm of belief, forming beliefs are constrained normatively by truth, it follows that beliefs are constrained normatively by evidence as well. After specifying the idea, we will consider the wide-scope norm of belief, according to which “one ought to (believe that p iff p is true)”. Our claim which we are going to argue for is that the wide-scope norm of truth has a better explanatory role with respect to evidence in comparison with the narrow-scope norm of belief.
