Hossein Salimi; Leila Ahar
Abstract
Analyzing the phenomena of the social world based on the idea is the purpose of this article. The paper attempts to show that ideas as the explanatory factor can be used in the study of social and political issues. To explain the analytic role of the idea, we take a constructivist-interpretive overview ...
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Analyzing the phenomena of the social world based on the idea is the purpose of this article. The paper attempts to show that ideas as the explanatory factor can be used in the study of social and political issues. To explain the analytic role of the idea, we take a constructivist-interpretive overview of the question "How is it possible?". Accordingly, the thinking human is at the center of attention. According to the constructivist-interpretive approach, it is the qualities in the thinking human that enable him to construct an idea of meaning and then give effect to it. These features include: 1) the human mental structure, (2) the ideographic perception of human, (3) the representational role of concepts and language in human, (4) causality in human, (5) rationality in human action. This article explains how human beings can influence the phenomena of the social world by explaining these characteristics in humans. By Understanding how the idea is influenced we show that the idea has the potential to be used as an explanatory factor for the analysis of social phenomena, including politics.
Seyed Ali Kalantari; Meghdad Ghari
Abstract
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, ...
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On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in Epistemology, there is a normative relation between a belief and its content. On the basis of a well-known formulation of the Relation, which we call the narrow-scope norm of Truth, “one ought to (believe that p) iff p is true”. Our focus, in this paper concerns the explanatory role of the truth norm of belief with regard to the norm of evidence, according to which "one ought to (believe that p) iff evidence supports its truth"; we will call the latter norm, the narrow-scope norm of evidence. On the basis of the idea, evidence is not independently valuable, but their normativity pro producing beliefs depends on the truth norm of belief. In another words, as evidence typically point toward truth and that, according to the truth norm of belief, forming beliefs are constrained normatively by truth, it follows that beliefs are constrained normatively by evidence as well. After specifying the idea, we will consider the wide-scope norm of belief, according to which “one ought to (believe that p iff p is true)”. Our claim which we are going to argue for is that the wide-scope norm of truth has a better explanatory role with respect to evidence in comparison with the narrow-scope norm of belief.
zeinab salari; Ebrahim Azadegan
Abstract
Epistemological orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it permits only truth-related factors to be relevant to whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Contrary to this orthodoxy, ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ argues that embracing fallibilism we must concede that in addition to truth-related ...
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Epistemological orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it permits only truth-related factors to be relevant to whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Contrary to this orthodoxy, ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ argues that embracing fallibilism we must concede that in addition to truth-related factors, there are pragmatic conditions on knowledge mainly in what is at stake for us in our practical situation. Independent of fallibilism there is also a positive case for ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ to be made namely a principled argument for a pragmatist link between knowledge and action (KJ). What you know is warranted enough to justify you in both action and belief. KJ is defended on the basis of two premises on reasons, and when combined with fallibilism, it entails the denial of purism. This may seem counterintuitive; thus, theories like epistemic contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism have tried to combine purism and the intuitions concerning pragmatic encroachment. This endeavor, as we shall show, is without success. Critical reflections on pragmatic encroachment are based for the most part on its relation with belief, including certain conceptions of outright belief and degrees of confidences or credences in graded belief. In contrast to what these reflections aim at, pragmatic encroachment is not reducible to a pragmatic account of belief. Bearing in mind above considerations, it may turn out that the denial of purism is not as much counterintuitive at it may seem.
Seyed Ali Kalantari
Abstract
It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, ...
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It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, according to Steglich-Petersen, we need to know not only that they acknowledge the norm, but that they are motivated to follow it. I will argue that this apparent truism is false in the case of constitutive norms. In a constitutive norm, the action specified in the correctness condition is constitutive of what is governed by the norm. I will focus on the constitutive norm of belief to argue that the mere acknowledgment of the norm suffices to explain the transparency of belief. That is to say, I explain why a subject who deliberates whether to believe that p thereby, in virtue of acknowledgment of the belief norm, deliberates whether p.
zahra khazaei
Abstract
According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood ...
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According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. This study seeks to show that these two phenomena – unlike Holton's claim – are not distinct, but the accounts of Akrasia and weakness of will take two approaches to explain the reasons behind quitting actions: (1) in terms of its relationship to the agent; and (2) in terms of its relationship to the action. The researcher attempts to show that Holton's interpretation of the weakness of will refers to the second perspective whereas Aristotle approaches it from two perspectives. However, on duly analyzing the elements put forward by Holton, we can see them to be consistent with those of Aristotle.
Sayed Ali kalantari
Abstract
On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relation between belief and its content. The normative relation is typically formulated by a norm which is called "the norm of belief" in the literature such that "one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true" (Shah 2003, ...
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On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relation between belief and its content. The normative relation is typically formulated by a norm which is called "the norm of belief" in the literature such that "one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true" (Shah 2003, 2009). My focus in this paper, concerns an argument regarding the normativity of belief thesis which is called "the no norm argument" developed by Gluer and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013, 2015). On the basis of the argument, Gluer and Wikforss claim that the norm of belief does not have the role of guidance for the act of belief formation. On this ground they conclude the implausibility of the normativity of belief thesis. The key aim of the present paper is to criticize Gluer and Wikforss's claim. To this aim, after considering the normativity of belief thesis, I will specify the scope of actions which is constrained by the norm of belief. After criticizing Gluer and Wikforss's claim, I will end the paper by an analysis of following the norm of belief on the basis of the normativity of belief thesis.
muhammad ali abbasian chaloshtari
Volume 9, Issue 35 , October 2013, , Pages 115-136
Abstract
As the psychological tendency to accept a proposition as true, belief has two aspects; on the one hand, it leads to practical consequences. When we hold a belief, other psychological tendencies emerge as a result. A belief can not only change our behavior but also affect our life to a large degree. This ...
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As the psychological tendency to accept a proposition as true, belief has two aspects; on the one hand, it leads to practical consequences. When we hold a belief, other psychological tendencies emerge as a result. A belief can not only change our behavior but also affect our life to a large degree. This is called the “pragmatic” aspect of belief. On the other hand, a belief can lead or at least bring us closer to the truth or falseness of a preposition. It is called the “epistemological” aspect of belief in this paper. Ignoring the second aspect, epistemological philosophers only address truth or falseness and reason or process. In their viewpoint, it is only truth or falseness, reference to facts, permissibility or impermissibility, and reliability or unreliability that make a belief epistemologically significant. Therefore, epistemology fails to address such Islamic principles as “faith” , “atheism” , “polytheism” , and “discord”. As the main terms and notions stated in the Holy Qur’an, they are the combinations of the two aspects of belief and have to lose this feature to enter the realm of epistemological research.
luis pojhan
Abstract
For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various creedal statements contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked upon as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for salvation. This causes great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of the importance ...
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For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various creedal statements contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked upon as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for salvation. This causes great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of the importance of belief in religion and in life in general. It is a question that has been neglected in philosophy of religion and Christian theology. In this paper I shall explore the question of the importance of belief as a religious attitude and suggest that there is at least one other attitude which may be adequate for religious faith even in the absence of belief, that attitude being hope. I shall develop a concept of faith as hope as an alternative to the usual notion that makes propositional belief that God exists a necessary condition for faith, as Plantinga implies in the quotation above. For simplicity’s sake I shall concentrate on the most important proposition in Western religious creeds, that which states that God exists (defined broadly as a benevolent, supreme Being, who is responsible for the creation of the universe), but the analysis could be applied mutatis mutandis to many other important propositions in religion (e.g., the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity). I am not sure how these ideas fit into Islamic thought, but I offer up my paper to stimulate discussion between Christian and Islamic philosophy on the subjects of faith and doubt.
