philosophy
Mohammad Taghi Iman; Ali Bandarrigizadeh
Abstract
The ideas that have been fixed in a human’s mind, and the abstract realm of his life, in addition to its concrete realm is under their extensive and deep affections, are ideas whose spectrality is manifested in Stirner’s formulation of the human world. Despite encompassing thesecharacteristics, ...
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The ideas that have been fixed in a human’s mind, and the abstract realm of his life, in addition to its concrete realm is under their extensive and deep affections, are ideas whose spectrality is manifested in Stirner’s formulation of the human world. Despite encompassing thesecharacteristics, which are the characteristics of the essential, the specters of ideas are open to presenting an inessential project. Such this project, which is based on disclosing a conceptual binary in Deleuze’s philosophical system, discloses a philosophical reading which manifests the spectrality of idea as a basis for the essentiality of a certain sphere that “human” conceptual signifier constructs. This Stirnerean reading reveals that such a sphere is the non-pluralistic embodiment of its constituent elements.
Yassaman Hoshyar
Abstract
According to some interpretations, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a coherent and unified work and does not follow a single issue; in other words, in each two or three books a subject is introduced as a subject of metaphysics. ; For example, in the fourth book, Aristotle refers to a new phrase “being ...
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According to some interpretations, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a coherent and unified work and does not follow a single issue; in other words, in each two or three books a subject is introduced as a subject of metaphysics. ; For example, in the fourth book, Aristotle refers to a new phrase “being qua being” and in the seventh book, he used the term “Ousia” as the subject of this episteme. In this paper, we try to clarify Aristotle's view of these terms, as well as their relationship with each other, and also with other concepts that play an essential role in Aristotle's metaphysics (such as the concept of essence and form). In this way, it becomes clear whether an alternative interpretation can be presented to show that Aristotle has been able to establish a new episteme with a new and unique subject in this book and has been able to respond to the difficulties of the Beta book (aporia of Beta) as a the guideline of Metaphysics. By concentrating on four books of Metaphysics (I, III, IV, and VII), this article tries to investigate the above items and show Aristotle's innovations in some positions, as well as some aspects of his philosophical differentiation of Plato's philosophy.
ahmad asgari
Abstract
In Metaphysics (Book IX), Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of the word Dunamis (force) and states that the first sense is related to motion. While discussing Dunamis as force in detail, he declares that he does so to shed light on the second sense of the word. Later in the book, he vaguely ...
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In Metaphysics (Book IX), Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of the word Dunamis (force) and states that the first sense is related to motion. While discussing Dunamis as force in detail, he declares that he does so to shed light on the second sense of the word. Later in the book, he vaguely explains the second sense. Thus, there are different interpretations of this sense among which two are of utmost significance. Some believe it to refer to potentiality while others interpret it to refer to substance. This article is an attempt to solve this enigma: Aristotle aims to study potentiality in his book. This, however, requires the study of different types of force, one of which is the force related to motion and the other is substance related to essence. Aristotle calls it “the most useful”, i.e. the most useful in analyzing the potentiality. Potentiality is, therefore, the main objective he seeks to attain through the analysis of the second sense of Dunamis.
ala turani; fatemeh delshad
Abstract
This paper seeks to demonstrate Kant's and Avicenna's belief in the objectivity of time. First, their views on the generalities are studied and the manner in which they are extracted from tangible and external issues explained. Second, their views on the objectivity and nature of time are explained. ...
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This paper seeks to demonstrate Kant's and Avicenna's belief in the objectivity of time. First, their views on the generalities are studied and the manner in which they are extracted from tangible and external issues explained. Second, their views on the objectivity and nature of time are explained. Time is a real perception according to Avicenna and a synthetic a priori concept according to Kant. Since the real perceptions and synthetic a priori concepts are the confluence of subjective and objective issues, the objective nature of time is established. Moreover, time-related issues, including the dependence of events on matter, time and its essence are addressed.
hasan ahmadi; mastaneh kakai
Abstract
The problem of God as ipsum esse is dependent to the way of understanding esse and defining acts of being and existence. Aquinas shows the importance of this problem in On Binge and Essence. Aquinas uses being (esse) in different meanings in his works. In Summa theological, he ascribes two meanings to ...
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The problem of God as ipsum esse is dependent to the way of understanding esse and defining acts of being and existence. Aquinas shows the importance of this problem in On Binge and Essence. Aquinas uses being (esse) in different meanings in his works. In Summa theological, he ascribes two meanings to esse: the act of essence, and the composition of a proposition affected by the mind in predicating a predicate to a subject. We use the second meaning about God as well as the first meaning; we say "God exists" is true. Aquinas notes that not only about things that composed of matter and form, but also about sui generis substances, the essence differs from existence. Only is God the same as his essence. Aquinas believes the name "He who exists" is most properly applies to God. The being is the most unlimited and universal name which its only bearer is the sui generis existent whose essence is the same as his existence.
