Marzieh Foroozandeh; Saeed Zibakalam Monfared; Hossein Mesbahian
Abstract
John Rawls's theory of justice is one of the most famous views in the political philosophy of the twentieth century. Contemporary German philosopher Yurgen Habermas believes that Rawls cannot justify this theory. Because the justification for this theory is based on some special premises that can not ...
Read More
John Rawls's theory of justice is one of the most famous views in the political philosophy of the twentieth century. Contemporary German philosopher Yurgen Habermas believes that Rawls cannot justify this theory. Because the justification for this theory is based on some special premises that can not be compatible with other Rawls's essential views. This article examines Habermas's critique by carefully reading Rawls' theory of justice. It seems that Habermas's critique can be answered in two ways: The first answer seeks justification in what Rawls calls the "public reason" of a society. This answer is more in line with Rawls' appearance, but Habermas considers this interpretation of Rawls's theory to be contextualist and does not accept it. The second answer tries to focus on the concept of "general facts" in Rawls's theory, and provide a basis for the universal and non-contextual justification of Rawls's theory; the basis that Habermas claimed Rawls lacked.
zeinab salari; Ebrahim Azadegan
Abstract
Epistemological orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it permits only truth-related factors to be relevant to whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Contrary to this orthodoxy, ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ argues that embracing fallibilism we must concede that in addition to truth-related ...
Read More
Epistemological orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it permits only truth-related factors to be relevant to whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Contrary to this orthodoxy, ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ argues that embracing fallibilism we must concede that in addition to truth-related factors, there are pragmatic conditions on knowledge mainly in what is at stake for us in our practical situation. Independent of fallibilism there is also a positive case for ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’ to be made namely a principled argument for a pragmatist link between knowledge and action (KJ). What you know is warranted enough to justify you in both action and belief. KJ is defended on the basis of two premises on reasons, and when combined with fallibilism, it entails the denial of purism. This may seem counterintuitive; thus, theories like epistemic contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism have tried to combine purism and the intuitions concerning pragmatic encroachment. This endeavor, as we shall show, is without success. Critical reflections on pragmatic encroachment are based for the most part on its relation with belief, including certain conceptions of outright belief and degrees of confidences or credences in graded belief. In contrast to what these reflections aim at, pragmatic encroachment is not reducible to a pragmatic account of belief. Bearing in mind above considerations, it may turn out that the denial of purism is not as much counterintuitive at it may seem.
mohammad ali abbasian
Abstract
Gettier problems are cases, or examples, which appear to run counter JTB analyses of knowledge as justified true belief. According to JTB theory of knowledge, S knows p, only if: a) The proposition p in true; b) S believes that p; c) S is justified in his belief that p. Gettier problems state that the ...
Read More
Gettier problems are cases, or examples, which appear to run counter JTB analyses of knowledge as justified true belief. According to JTB theory of knowledge, S knows p, only if: a) The proposition p in true; b) S believes that p; c) S is justified in his belief that p. Gettier problems state that the three conditions (a-c) are not sufficient for explaining what knowledge is. Because there might be some counter examples, which are cases of justified true belief but are not considered as cases of knowledge. Most of the epistemologists have accepted Gettier’s conclusion and tried to find an alternative theory of knowledge. Many of these epistemologists have tried to add a fourth condition to the earlier three conditions (a-c), to get a Gettier-proof definition of knowledge. According to one of these strategies, the added condition is: d) the epistemic justification for truth of his belief is not a refutable one. And according to another strategy, the added condition is: d´) the epistemic justification for truth of his belief is not a defeasible one. However, we will see that both of these proposals encounter to Gettier problem