Ahmad Ebadi; Mohammad Emdadi Masouleh
Abstract
Hillary Putnam is one of the contemporary philosophers who study the fact/value dichotomy. In his thoughts, these two concepts are interpretation and even conceptually not separate, a notion named instructive pragmatism. He accuses the advocates of this dichotomy and believes that when they say morality ...
Read More
Hillary Putnam is one of the contemporary philosophers who study the fact/value dichotomy. In his thoughts, these two concepts are interpretation and even conceptually not separate, a notion named instructive pragmatism. He accuses the advocates of this dichotomy and believes that when they say morality is separate from fact, they base their trust on the supposition that they realize fact in its exact sense. He sets three reasons that lead to resorting to this dichotomy of reality/value and by rejecting all, paves the way for his criticism of this dichotomy. The drawbacks recognized by him in this context, consist of 1. conversion of a non-destructive distinction into a destructive metaphysical dichotomy, 2. The impact of science from the values in generating science, 3. existence of consensus regarding ethical issues similar to that of other domains, 4. inaccuracy in the analysis of moral judgment into the two perspective and descriptive components, 5. wrong moral thick concepts, a reason in the interpretation of facts and values. Next to accepting his thoughts, and strong points in rejecting fact/value dichotomy, we believe when he defends the character of constructive facts, the following deficiencies become evident in his views: 1. inaccuracy in changing facts due to the conceptual schema, 2. the problem of backward causation, 3. lack of conceptual competence, 4. problem of incoherence and 5. use mention fallacy. The objective of this paper is to analyze and assess the strong and weak points of Putman’s views on fact/value dichotomy.
Ahmad Ebadi; Mohammad Emdadi Masouleh
Abstract
In this paper, by reviewing the main components of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy it will become evident that he is a critic on the distinction between the context of discovery/justification in the methodology of science. His reasoning consists of: 1. his proponents have merely dealt with the context ...
Read More
In this paper, by reviewing the main components of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy it will become evident that he is a critic on the distinction between the context of discovery/justification in the methodology of science. His reasoning consists of: 1. his proponents have merely dealt with the context of discovery/justification in the educational realm, according to which only the evidence regarding the justification of a hypothesis is considered effective, and the other aspects of justification are ignored. 2. the distinction of two contents is based on oversimplification in process of producing science, which merely refers to the strong point of the theories, not the weakness. 3. there exists no empirical determination in the context of justification. 4. in the process of producing science the descriptive and prescriptive aspects, of the hypotheses, are inseparable and intertwined. 5. unlike the proponents of this distinction the structured lexicon in the context of justification has no fixed and definite consequences but is subject to Kant’s relativized a priori principles facing constant change, modification, and reparation. After pronouncing these problems, Kuhn was criticized by his proponents of distinction of discovery/justification in a few contexts: 1. adopting intention on ambiguous writing style in his works, 2. applying the cyclic approach in providing an epistemic-realistic criteria list and retrieval to the non-epistemic criteria, 3. confusion between the context of decision and context of justification and concerning cause instead of reason. To escape from these criticisms, he points to the following two issues: 1. misunderstanding of his views by sympathizers of the distinction and 2. providing criteria as to preserve the objectivity of science different from the proponents of the distinction. The objective of this paper is to analyze, complete, and criticize Kuhn’s thoughts regarding the distinction of discovery/justification.
