these two lights together -- the inductive light of facts and the rational light of philosophical analysis -- both together fortify and strengthen one another. And both together constitute, in my opinion, the proper objective content of the philosophy of history, i.e., intelligible data and connections which have been drawn from facts by induction, but which are checked and verified by a rational analysis.

Endnote

1. with the exception of Ibn Khaldun whose famous work, *Al-Thar* is in some way a philosophy of history, but it should be added that his philosophy of history should be evaluated according to the origins of his own ideas, and not in terms of its popular sense.

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http://phoenixandturtle.net/bibliography.htm#hegel lectures


situation which is totally at variance with scientific objectivity, where all that pertains to the subjective dispositions of man, except as regards the virtue of science, disappears or should disappear. For the historian it is a prerequisite that he have a sound philosophy of man, an integrated culture, an accurate appreciation of the human being's various activities and their comparative importance, a correct scale of moral, political, religious, technical and artistic values. The value, I mean the truth, of the historical work will be in proportion to the human richness of the historian.

Such a position implies no subjectivism. There is truth in history. And each one of the components of the historian's intellectual disposition has its own specific truth. But the truth of history is factual, not rational truth; it can therefore be substantiated only through signs -- after the fashion in which any individual and existential datum is to be checked; and though in many respects it can be known not only in a conjectural manner but with certainty, it is neither knowable by way of demonstration properly speaking, nor communicable in a perfectly cogent manner, because, in the last analysis, the very truth of the historical work involves the whole truth which the historian as a man happens to possess; it presupposes true human wisdom in him; it is "a dependent variable of the truth of the philosophy which the historian has brought into play".

3. Let us return now to the philosophy of history. Its objective content consists of universal objects of thought, which are either the typical features of a given historical age or some essential aspect of human history in general, and which are inductively abstracted from historical data. It seems to me particularly important to stress the part played here by induction. A number of factual data are accumulated by history, and now from these data concerning a period of history or any other aspect of history some universal objects of thought are inductively abstracted by the philosopher. But in addition, these universal objects of thought must be philosophically verified, i.e., checked with some philosophical truths previously acquired. Then we see that they involve some intelligible necessity founded in the nature of things and providing us with a raison d'être. Induction and philosophical truths are and must be joined together in order to have the objective content of the philosophy of history.

Our point is that neither induction alone nor philosophical deduction alone are sufficient. They must complement one another. We don't believe in a merely aprioristic philosophy of history, founded either on purely philosophical insights or on dialectical exigencies. But if we have
is the only abstract and universal object, disclosing intelligible "quiddities" or *raisons d'être*, i.e., the only "scientific" (or rather wisdom-fitting) object, in the sphere of historical knowledge.

What philosophy needs as a basis, I may add, is the certitude of the facts, the general facts, from which it starts. Philosophy works on factual material which has been established with certainty. Now scientific facts are not the only well-ascertained facts. I remember Pierre Duhem, the celebrated physicist and historian of the sciences, insisting many years ago that the data of the senses or of common sense are in general more certain (they are less precise, and therefore they are not useful for science itself) than scientific facts. Therefore the data of the senses or of the common knowledge of man, when philosophically criticized, may serve as matter for the philosopher of nature. And similarly the data of history -- I don't refer to the recitation of the details of singular events, which is but a presupposed background, but to certain significant general facts and factual relations -- may serve as matter for the philosopher of history, because history is capable of factual certitude.

2. At this point we meet a problem which is preliminary to any discussion of the philosophy of history, namely, the problem of historical knowledge itself. What is the value of historical knowledge? Are there such things as historical truth and historical certitude? Dilthey was very much concerned with such problems.

Henri Marrou is perfectly right in insisting that historical truth is utterly different from scientific truth, and does not have the same kind of objectivity. It is truth, or conformity with being, but the demonstration of which can *never* be finished (it involves an infinite); it has objectivity, but a peculiar sort of objectivity, in the attainment of which all of the thinking subject as an intellectual agent is engaged.

There is perhaps a little too much of Kantianism in Marrou's approach; but his thesis is, to my mind, fundamentally true. Since history is not concerned with abstract essences to be brought out from the singular, but with aspects of the singular itself to be picked up as particularly important, it is clear that the manner in which the historian directs his attention is a determinant factor in the process. And this direction of attention itself depends on the entire intellectual setting of the subject. So the entire *intellectual* disposition (We do not say, except in a most indirect and remote manner, the affective disposition, for the historian is not necessarily a poet, though perhaps the perfect historian would be a poet) -- the entire *intellectual* disposition of the subject (the historian) plays an indispensable part in the attainment of historical truth: a
the individual -- by individual circumstances, motivations, or events. The historical elucidation, being individual, participates in the potential infinity of matter; it is never finished; it never has (insofar as it is elucidation) the certainty of science. It never provides us with a raison d'être drawn from what things are in their very essence (even if it be known only through signs, as in the sciences of phenomena).

What can we answer? I would answer that the fact that history is not a science does not make a philosophy of history impossible, because it is enough for philosophy itself to be "scientific" knowledge and a formal or systematized discipline of wisdom. And it is in no way necessary that the subject matter with which philosophy deals should be a subject matter previously known and worked out by some particular science. For instance, we have a philosophy of art, though art is not a science. The philosophy of art deals with the same subject matter as art, but it deals with it from the philosophical point of view and in a philosophical light. Therefore, we have a philosophy of art which is essentially distinct from art itself, and which provides us with philosophical knowledge about a matter which has not been previously scientifically elucidated. And I would make a similar observation if it were a question of the philosophy of nature. A philosophy of nature was possible before any developed scientific knowledge of nature, or when our scientific knowledge of nature was quite unsatisfactory. Thus it is that in the case of the philosophy of history we have a "scientific" object insofar as this object is the object of philosophy, but not insofar as the subject matter was previously scrutinized by some other scientific discipline.

We would say, therefore, that the philosophy of history has the same subject matter as history, which is not a science. And I might add, symmetrically, that the philosophy of nature has the same subject matter as physics and chemistry, which are sciences. But the philosophy of history has another object than history. It is concerned with an objective content -- in Scholastic terms, a formal object -- other than that of history and of the historical explanation; just as the philosophy of nature has a formal object other than that of physics and chemistry. In the case of the philosophy of nature, however, the formal object of physics and chemistry is scientific, and the formal object of the philosophy of nature is another intelligible and universal object, a more intelligible and a more universal object, in the sphere of the knowledge of nature. But in the case of the philosophy of history, the formal object of history is not scientific -- it is not universal, not necessary, not raised to the level of abstract intelligibility. And the formal object of the philosophy of history
domination of the Reason that the subject's will and power are realized, and in proportion to it, path of history comes to correspond to the development of the self-established subject. What has appeared in the present time concerning history and its statements from sociological and anthropological views, all and all, should be seen through this view to the world, man, and its inexorable results.

Is any Philosophy of History possible?

1. We have a first great example of such a philosophy in St. Augustine's *City of God*. Here we are given an interpretation of human history in the perspective of Christianity -- an interpretation that opposed the oriental conceptions of the eternally recurrent phases of destruction and regeneration of the cosmos. Christianity has taught us that history has a direction that it works in a determined direction. History is not an eternal return; it does not move in circles. Time is linear, not cyclical. This truth was a crucial acquisition for human thought.

   St. Augustine's philosophy of history was a work of wisdom, both of theology and of philosophy, and more of theology. But in the mind of St. Augustine both wisdoms, the philosophical and the theological, worked together. And his *City of God* attempts to bring out the intelligible and, so to speak, trans-historical meaning of history, the intelligible meaning of the sequence or development of events in time. This is precisely the general object of the philosophy of history, especially in the chapter XI and next (Augustinus, 1966).

   Yet we are immediately confronted with a preliminary objection: how can a philosophy of history be possible, since history is not a science? History deals only with the singular and the concrete, with the contingent, whereas science deals with the universal and the necessary. History cannot afford us any explanation by universal *raison d'être*. No doubt there are no "raw" facts; an historical fact presupposes and involves as many critical and discriminating judgments, and analytical recastings, as any other "fact" does; moreover, history does not look for an impossible "coincidence" with the past; it requires choice and sorting, it interprets the past and translates it into human language, it re-composes or re-constitutes sequences of events resulting from one another, and it cannot do so without the instrumentality of a great deal of abstraction. Yet history uses all this in order to link the singular with the singular; its *object* as such is individual or singular. The explanation given by an historian, as historian, is an explanation of the individual by
1. In philosophy of history- or in history in its modern sense and viewpoint at the past has changed. The pre-modern historian did not consider history and the past as some things independent from “existence” and the world’s general plan; and he deemed it as an aspect and manifestation of Divine manifestations; thus, coming and going of individuals, societies, and tribes as well as their end and destiny would be interpreted according to the Divine providence; whereas in the modern philosophy of history, history is an existing thing and thus independent from the Absolute Being. Essentially, without affirming independent existence of history, philosophy of history will not be established; and it is only under the light of distinction between nature and man that periods and eras find relations to the Reason, Idea, and logical necessity. Modern history and philosophy of history are, in fact, results of man’s self-consciousness of power of his will and manipulation in nature.

2. In the modern philosophy of history, the concept of world history is included; that is, a history which may occur in all places and for all tribes and nations. Upon emergence of world history, formulation of histories of science, literature, culture, philosophy, education, arts, politics, and ethics has begun and the stages of its development are justified in accord to the stages of man’s consciousness- and in fact self-consciousness. Vico, who is in some way considered as the founder of philosophy of history, in The Modern Science, has made distinctions between the world’s three stages in such a way that this may signify development of man’s empirical consciousness. Nevertheless, periods taken by him are not Greeks, theologians, and mystics’ periods of the world of being; but rather they are periods independent from existence and levels of spheres. In this view, like nature, history is governed by law, but not an eternal and Divine law; but rather according to conditions of the perceiver and conditions of consciousness; history as well is bound to principles and rules which are based on the subject. Having criticized Descartes who considered no importance for history, Vico describes it as being more knowable than nature, and believes that, since history is a result of development of consciousness and in some way a man’s making, thus it is more knowable than nature.

Since in the modern philosophy of history and in particular as it was shown in the Enlightenment, “understanding” and “reason” grant meaning to things and objects and realize them, thus there remain nothing which may be out of the scope of consciousness. Thus, demystification is among results of such a view, and decoding mysteries and certain knowledge of the world are among these results. It is through
thinking concerning history and situations of nations, tribes, and communities among Muslim scholars; and for instance what we see in works of scholars and philosophers such as Farabi, Maskwayh, and Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi concerning politics and sociology are not devoid of speculative and philosophical look at history. To these we should add important and everlasting works of Tabari, Ya’qubi, Bayhaqi, Ibn Athir, Ibn Kathir as well as a series of works in the forms of biographies, Reminders and memorandums; all of which signify Muslim scholars’ attempt to know factors and causes influential in historical events and relations between them.

Ibn Khaldun’s famous work, *al-Ibar*, is an important and influential historiographical document in the collection of sciences of Islamic civilization which, undoubtedly, has influenced many Eastern and Western thinkers’ views. Introduction of the concept of “group feeling” (*’asabiyyat*) which conceptually means “join between individuals based on common interests” as well as distinction between three stages of collective life (primitive–rural–urban) which are called in his terminology, three kinds of *’inran* (civilization) have drawn attention of many people of vision. Apart from results gained from Ibn Khaldun’s thinking which may be naturally accepted or criticized by people of vision, importance of his thinking and scientific methodology lies in the fact that he has managed to consistently apply his own religious and theological view in analyzing historical events, and in this way, to present a particular revision of speculative history. Other works of Muslim scholars in this domain as well are of importance and considered among important works concerning history; but the point is that the latter scholars’ look at history is basically different from what has been previously said. In this view, states of affair is not reduced to mental conditions of the subject; but rather man, nature, and history are various aspect of the same reality and each of them, in proportion to its existential position, reflects a manifestation of Divine providence, and thus human agent and his intra-essential aspects are not above causes creating events, but they are positioned horizontally to them, and all causes find their meanings under the Truth’s act and will. Thus, to apply the term “philosophy of history” to this religious view, if its particular conditions are taken into account in the context of Divine and religious thinking, is justified. In conclusion and to bring our discussion to an end, some characteristics of the modern historical thinking and philosophy of history resulted from it are mentioned in order to better understand the above-mentioned distinctions:
free from main qualities and constituents of modern thinking. Thus, that some ones have considered “post-modern” as going beyond “modern” is a great mistake which is a result of neglecting the essence and spirit of modern world and its conditions and results. Nevertheless, in post-modern situation, history like categories such as art, politics, and religion cannot be interpreted independent from the self-established subject; and naturally, it depends, in its various revisions, deeply on intra-essential conditions of the perceiver.

As to historical thinking based on religion and revelatory teaching, an independent article is necessary. It goes without saying that not only based on the Holy Quran, which includes all teachings of prophets and is the seal of them, but also in other traditions of other divine prophets, their scriptures, and teachings, history has been introduced as a manifestation of God’s will and its appearance; and periods of history are periods of the manifestation of truth and Divine providence. In Jew and Christian Scriptures as well, the beginning and the end of the world are simultaneous with emergence of prophets who are appointed to execute divine commands and His eternal providence; and in the period between the beginning and the end, there are prophets and messengers who remind their addressees of divine tradition and legislation and command them to follow these. In the science of theology and mysticism (’Irfan), in each period of periods of the world, a name from among [divine] names dominates and all what has an appearance shows a manifestation of His Being. In this view, history has periods whose beginning and end are prophets, but those prophets who are obligated to execute divine commands, and thinks of, and act to, nothing other than His will; and thus history is gradual stages of realization of the Divine providence. In the science of theology, it has been adequately shown that the Truth’s providence and will as well as eternal and eternal destiny are not inconsistency with man’s free will and power of choice; for in the affairs of world, God is agent-by-relationship; and Divine acts are not realized unless there would be various causes and preparations, “God makes thing done through causes”. Thus, from religious viewpoint, history is not independent from divine act and knowledge; and as already said, through recording events, the historian, on the one hand, discusses the way in which Divine providence is realized, and on the other, he reminds the reader of Divine act. Such a conception of history and its events is hardly related to the modern philosophy of history, and even if it is spoken of as “philosophy of history”, it should be considered together with own principles and origins. This does not deny the speculative
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relation to the process of production and labour, objectifies history and becomes its motive; though, following Hegel, he considers a period of history as peaceful point, and its full perfection and establishment. Also, Spengler’s famous work, *The Decline of the West* (1918-1923), though it had been forgotten for a while, after the World War II, it became again focus of attention. Contemplating on the principles and categories of culture, he understood that each culture, like a living and independent thing, was born and grew, and eventually it would decline. When cultures actualize all their possibilities and present their possessions, they will go gradually to decline. He believes that culture and civilization are two different things. Civilization is the external manifestation and body of culture; while culture is accounted as the spirit of civilization. For him, spirit culture of the Western civilization is a “Faustian spirit” which inclines to the infinite and its manifestations may be seen abundantly in artistic makings such as the Western music, painting, and architecture. Since he considers the Western civilization, in some way, as the final stage of culture, he deems the present time as the period of totality of the Western culture and emergence of all its capacities in forms of technical manifestations (Mojtahedi, 2003/1382, p.164).

Unlike Spengler, having emphasized the concept of “civilization” and its parts and causes, Toynbee, however, in his detailed book, *Study of History*, believed that interactions and relations between civilizations, though they are historically, geographically, and temporally independent of each other, cannot be denied; and from among them religious and theological factors are the most influential ones in interactions between civilizations and at the same time their collapse. Toynbee’s emphasis on religious factor went so far that he, influenced by some Christian theologians like Agustin, considered the world as a place for manifestation of the Divine act to realize *utopia*, and deemed the process of events as an all-reflective mirror of divine providence (Walsh, 1979, p.123). His emphasis on the Greek civilization and its conditions, however, brings him to believe in domination and establishment of a particular form of culture in the history; and it is this which has caused some misconceptions of his thought during recent decades.

Social, political, and cultural developments before and after the World War II, caused some changes in thinkers’ understanding and analysis of history, and led to emergence of a new critical approach in the form of post-modern thinking; but it should be noticed that since critique is among qualities of modern thinking and post-modern is classified under introduction of questions and critical thinking, inevitably it may not be
fact, gradual epistemic process which goes from the mere intra-essence aspect to the extra-essence aspect; and "phenomenology of consciousness" is in fact an attempt to show the way in which this kind of consciousness is realized in the context of reality. That is why in Hegel's philosophy, "phenomenology", "philosophy of history" and "logic" relate to each other and exhibit a form of their own in others. If it seems that it is only history that shows the extra-essential and objective aspect of events, it should be noticed that firstly philosophy of history here concerns mental and intra-essential of the same events; and secondly, phenomenology and even logic are realized in the context of objectivity and reality. Thus, in Hegel's view, there is a continuous interaction between the mind and fact so that it looks as if fact is the same as intelligible thing and intelligible thing is the same as that fact; and because of this, Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to understand rational aspect of things; but a rational aspect which itself follows the world's causal plan and "Absolute" will. For him, historical events are not effects of external things; but they are in fact actualization of internal possibilities and manifestation of knowledge of freedom.

The essence of the Spirit (Absolute) is nothing other than freedom; but when the Spirit as an infinite reality exhibits itself in nature as a finite thing, it has in fact realized itself and consequently it will become deprived of absolute freedom. From now on, wish to regain freedom forms its whole being.

"The spirit is free; and the aim of the world spirit in world history is to realize its essence and to obtain the prerogative of freedom. Its activity is that of knowing and recognizing itself (Hegel, 1975), "the Spirit wants to perfect its own truth and change nature according to its own essence".

Thus, it can be said that, for him, intentional causality is preferred to operative causality; and all events are justified according to their intentional aspect. From this viewpoint, it should be said that "philosophy of history" in the Enlightenment and in particular for Hegel is not other than recognition of influential, spiritual, mental factors of the subject in becoming of history and thus, though all historical events may not be reduced to the subject, priority of mental conditions of the perceiver to objective things has been, however, actually assumed.

Continuity of idealist view to history- which is in fact constitutive of philosophy of history and its essence- may be seen in other thinkers of modern time as well. From among them, Marx (1818-1873), Toynbee (1889-1975), Spengler (1880-1936), and Walsh may be mentioned. For Marx, it is class-consciousness and in fact self-consciousness that, in
interpret and analyze it according to his own free will.

The role played by science and man’s empirical achievements in the process of changes in perspectives and views to categories such as culture, philosophy, religion, art... may be seen in the context of developments of the eighteenth century. The most distinctive aspect of such development, perhaps, may be seen in the process of writing the “French Encyclopedia”. Though form and content of this Encyclopedia are very different from what is today written in the forms of Encyclopedia and Companion books; it is at the same time a continuous and even swift attempt to collect scientific and empirical data and to present an index (or indexes) to evaluate the value of consciousness. In the Enlightenment and for philosophers such as Kant as well, the highest form of valid knowledge looks like what has been exemplified in the Newtonian physics. Kant himself, of course, was not interested in history and historiography; considering some of his short and brief essays, however, one can find that at least the process of development of epistemic system had been of importance for him; and in this, proximity to the pattern of empirical knowledge had always been considered as a standard for objectivity (Beek, 1963, p.59). But for Kant’s successor, i.e. Herder (1744-1823) and then for idealist philosophers of that time such as Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling (1775-1854) and in particular for Hegel (1770-1831), the category of history became so important that knowledge, in the general sense of the term, and rational and philosophical knowledge, in the particular sense of the term, would be created only in relation to history; so that mind’s becoming and process of objective events, all and all, seek for a single goal which is verily perfect and inclusive realization of “Absolute Spirit” (Geist); and historical plan is, essentially, a translation of rational one and the latter is in accord to the former.

For Hegel, the world and its becoming are based on the lofty plan of the “Reason” and thus events cannot be considered as lacking goal and necessary relationships. “Necessity”, in its logical sense, speaks of emergence of things, and in this sense there is always a link of the kind of logical causality between the past thing and future one.

Philosophy’s task is verily to show rational structure of the Reason (Spirit) in the realm of nature and in the realm of human spirit and Reason’s becoming to attain absolute knowledge. This becoming is systematic and purposeful, and the goal here is full knowledge of man’s mind and spirit. Three stages of knowledge, which are sense consciousness, self consciousness, and rational consciousness, show, in
and modern.

"Historiography has, in general, two eras, in each of which a particular form has dominated historiography. Old historiography was to record remembrances and memories and perhaps history of honors. Since the eighteenth century onward, history is man's attempts to attain the present scientific-technological civilization. In the new historiography, historians have nothing to do with their predecessors' remembrances and memories. But rather, they write predecessors' letters of deeds; and thus, they pay attention particularly to lasting and everlasting things. It is in the new era of historiography that they write history of science, philosophy, art, religion, culture, and politics. Until the modern era, history of predecessors was a reminder of the past, a past which was not an introduction to "now", but rather its repetition and extension reached "now". Historiography of the modern era is not to record remembrance, but it is attempt to recognize the past according to modern criteria, standards, and methodologies" (Davari, 2000/1379, p.26).

It should not be forgotten, however, that before the eighteenth century and Enlightenment, the way for such a view was paved: on the one hand, man's conception and understanding of religion and his own realms of faith were changed; and on the other hand empirical science had come to play an all-comprehensive role in epistemic realms. Between the two, contribution of sciences which are in direct relation to man's power of will and manipulation is more easily recognizable. Among aspects which should be noticed in the process of development of sciences and its impacts is evolution of the concept of "infinity" and its relation to the subject: with the modern science, "infinity" was transformed from metaphysics to nature and from the realm of theology to the domain of physics, so that for Newton and Kant, time and space were infinite things and conditions for all empirical science. Kant was, of course, aware of the fact that results of Newtonian physics might not be generalized to a realm beyond physics; and that was why he declared that theoretical reason, according to principles of physics and because of limitation of cognitive powers, is not able to obtain convincing results in the domain of metaphysics problems. But in the realm of practical reason -and concretely in the realm of will and act- the same subject is able to objectify an aspect of infinity and to become origin of moral values (Mojtahedi, 2006/1385, p.245). In this picture provided for man's speculative and practical domains, it is man who, finally, not only imposes his own a priori conjectures to the concrete and finite things, but also as a moral agent he is able to grant meaning to "infinity" and
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may not be negated and abrogated. The picture depicted of the history in modern era, however, is utterly different. Since in the modern era, knowledge and science are based on positive thing, in this view, firstly, past loses its supra-natural and living status and meaning; and secondly, what we call past is itself an introduction to the present objective thing. In this sense, past is negated principally, and replaced by an understanding which grants meaning to all things—including past things—and interprets and analyzes them. In this picture, "history" comes to contrast to "nature", and unlike what the ancients thought, nature itself is considered as a level of history. For example, according to Hegel, history is development of exhibition of the "Absolute" in various eras and forms; and nature is the low level of this exhibition, for it is in the farthest distance from "Reason" and "Idea". In the latter picture of the history, past is not introduced in the above-mentioned sense; but rather since the modern consciousness is based on progress and advancement and this sense has been included in the term "positive", thus what finds value has to be related somehow to "now" and perhaps "future". It was not an accident that in classification of eras of consciousness, August Comte introduced religion, theology, mythology and even philosophy as introduction to the emergence of "positive science"; and in fact, he emphasized that past is of value merely because it makes preparations for emergence of "now"; and past, in itself, is of no value. Thus, history and historiography find meaning in terms of conditions of the subject’s consciousness and understanding; in other words, events and their details, firstly, enter man’s mental and ideal plan, and then they are introduced man’s language and analysis. Distinction between "humanities" and "natural sciences" spoken of by those like Kant as well originates from this conception of man of nature, history, and understanding; and if in contrary to what Greeks and in particular Aristotle thought, "history" is considered as one of human sciences, this means that what grants value and objectivity to a phenomenon called "history" is man’s understanding and its a priori aspects. Undoubtedly, man’s conception of "science" and its relation to other realms of man’s life such as art, religion, politics, and culture, in the Enlightenment era have been of influence in the latter conception of history; for in the plan of Enlightenment, man seems to find all his mental capacities and in particular his capacity to manipulate subject of knowledge and even negation or suspension of "fact", and thus history has no value and status independent from the subject- and thus agent through will. Then, it can be said that historiography is divided into two general eras: ancient
statements. This distinction was, in general, distinction between “nature” and “existence”. Following Descartes, Vico believed that all what created by man was more knowable than other things, for man had manipulated it in some way (Stanford, 2003/1382, p.256), and in the modern science, essentially, all things, including existence itself, are subject of man’s knowledge and understanding, and assume a conceptual form.

Before modern time, and in particular before eighteenth century, man understands of history and events were other than his understanding of history and historiography emerged in the modern time. For ancients, history is, principally, some sort of reminding and intention; that is, reminding the eternal law and tradition. That is why their historical books and writings are some sort of Reminder, which generally, begins with the story of Adam (a) and continues through the process of mission and prophetic way.

The title of Ibn Khaldun’s book as well suggests the same; for, al-‘ībar and its derivatives such as ‘inwar, are, indeed, some sort of reminding the eternal process of divine tradition which appears in the containers of time and place in various forms. This reminding the eternal entity is of so importance in traditional historiography that no thing will find its true meaning unless under its light; but we have to notice that that Divine and Eternal entity is not a making of man’s knowledge and mind; but rather man himself follows it and, inevitably, thinks and acts according to it. What was written in the ancient Greece and Pre-modern times about history is of this kind, and that Aristotle did not deem history as one of the sciences is because of this; because for him and persons like him, history is not subject of man’s understanding. Works of Herodotus and Tocididus as well are reminding objectification of a will which is exemplified in the container of events; and more accurately, details of events are interpreted in the general plan of existence. The Greeks attributed that general will to mythological figures and gods, whereas in the middle age and even for some modern thinkers such as Kierkegaard emergence of Abraham and Jesus Christ (a) and their lives and destines determine history’s orientation; and all things find their meanings in the plan of Adam’s descent, Abraham’s story, and in particular Jesus Christ’s life, crucifixion, and in particular his Resuscitation; and in this, man finds historical reality; but not that reality which is itself a creation and making of man, but rather man follows it. Thus, for ancients, past is not a great collection of terminated and obsolete events; but rather these are manifestations of a divine tradition; and here the historian’s duty is to record them and to remind addressees of them. Thus, principally, past
Philosophy of history is among those terms whose principal meanings cannot be found through analyzing them to their constituents, and they may be understood only through their principal and temporal origins. As we know, the term “philosophy” has a long history; and the term “history” as well is of Greek origin. The term “philosophy of history”, however, belongs to the modern age, and according to available evidence, it is one of the eighteenth-century terms. Voltaire (1694-1778) seems to be the first one who has employed the term “philosophy of history”; persons such as Vico (1668-1744) in Italy and Montesquieu in France (1689-1755), without making explicit mention to this term, have explained historical events in terms of some sort of deterministic causality. It is from now on that philosophy of history is independently introduced as one of the problems and enquiries of philosophy. In fact, it seems that history finds an existence independent from other things and events and becomes worthy to be subject of thinkers’ attention and is considered as a criterion for everything and in particular consciousness and knowledge. We ask whether before this time- that is, eighteenth century- people of philosophy had not paid attention to philosophy, and whether there have remained no sayings or writings concerning it from them.

Reply is that records of attention paid to the history- in its traditional and pre-modern sense- date back to very long ago. In the ancient Greece, poets and authors such as Homer, Hesiod, and Sophocles wrote about man’s status and limitations of his freedom and will against destiny in the forms of epics, fables, and tales about heroes; and historians like Tocididus and Herodotus put the same in the forms of reports made about Greeks wars with other tribes and nations. Through his narration about Peloponnesian wars, Tocididus proceeds to show that man’s destiny goes well with his reason and its degrees; and Herodotus tried to depict gods’ will in emergence of the Greek epic against their enemies and military foes. In the Greek tradition, the term “historia” means to narrate, to tell, and to report; and the contemporary term “story” relates to it. It should be noticed, however, that neither in Greek age, nor in middle age or in Islamic time, philosophers did not proceed to build an edifice of philosophy of history, and did not provide a plan like what is laid in the later sense of philosophy of history; since for them all what was understood from history and its conjectures was appropriate to existence and levels of being; it looks as if a status and realm independent from existence was considered for history, and its statements and conjectures were differentiated from previous ontological
Possibilities of the Philosophy of History

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Abstract

"Philosophy of History" is one of the specific terms of the modern age and enlightenment era which has been raised in the philosophical scientific space of eighteen century. This new approach to history based on the human knowledge of things and relation between them, and since understanding the external things and accidents means by a priori model of knower, so "the history" finds an subjective aspect and now it would be asked how can to apply this new mean of history to another tradition or even current evolutions? And is it possible to definite another sort of Philosophy of History or no?

Keywords: Philosophy of History, subjectivism, enlightenment, historicism, futurism.

For one who encounters, for the first time, the term "philosophy of history", perhaps, to define and explain the two terms "philosophy" and "history", and then to make a link between the two will help to better understand the compound term "philosophy of history". This is not, of course, logically wrong. To analyze terms to their constituents, however, is not always suitable to convey their true meanings; especially for terms which have not been coined through consensus of people of pen and linguists; but they have found their meanings because of their relations to the era. Or better, they are signs of human beings' particular relation to their environment and a token of human look at her/his own internal and external realms.

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