


principle of simple reality. Accordingly, God's detailed knowledge of things in the stage of essence would not be explicable. Naturally belief in the principality of quiddity would not be in accord with the principle of simple reality, since each quiddity is composed of rational and definable ingredients whereas simple reality lacks rational ingredients.

In Allameh Tabatabai's viewpoint, too, the Necessary Being in itself is the very genuine existence which its requirements are absoluteness of existence and God's existential application. Therefore we should consider Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabai's views on God's detailed knowledge of things as owing to the view of the principality of existence, the very fundamental principle that Sadr al-Mutâ'alehin in his margin on Sharh Hikmat al-Ishraq regards handling it as one of the most significant and prior philosophical objectives, the acquiring and proper comprehending of which requires great effort.

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of Plato, Avicenna, and Shaykh Ishraq on God’s detailed knowledge of things are under question. However, Farabi’s opinion which maintains that “since God’s essence is in a way that of all existents, so God’s rationalization of His essence is the rationalization of all existents in a way”, grounded Sadr ul-Muta’alehin’s theory who by innovation of the formula of simple reality and benefiting from it and the establishment of the principles has expounded and developed his theory which is a defensible theory. But the late Allameh Tabatabaii’s theory on God’s detailed knowledge of things, which is the existential application of God required for the supposition of the necessity of existence in-itself could be interpreted as a new type of reasoning.

Regardless of principles and fourfold preliminaries mentioned before and also the principle of "simple reality", on which Mulla Sadra’s view about God's detailed knowledge of things is founded, if we want to determine the basic and central view or views which establish the principle of "simple reality" and eventually the basis of Mulla Sadra's opinion on God's detailed knowledge of things and other opinions of him, also if we want to determine the basis of Allameh Tabatabaii’s view on God's detailed knowledge of things which is through the existential application of God and is essential for the assumption of necessity of the existence in-itself we should know that the basic ideas underlying Mulla Sadra's mentioned opinions are as follow:

1. Reality is indubitable by itself, rather any doubt in it or its denial is the very reality.
2. In reality, it is the existence which is original, i.e. the individual in-itself and the real evidence of the notion of existent is the reality of existence. Therefore quiddities are not valid. They are described merely due to comparison and credibility in an accidental and rather figurative manner to the existence.
3. The reality of existence by its very nature possesses a series of essential features, characteristics, injunctions, and rules such as knowledge, unity, necessity, and actuality.
4. The existence is a dubious and graded reality which starts from the Necessary and ends with matter.

Amongst the aforementioned views, that of the principality of existence and subjective consideration of the quiddity is more obvious due to its effect and role on God’s knowledge, because one can never believe in suspecting the existence and the stages of existences unless the principality of existence would be accepted. In that case, also one cannot discuss the simplicity of God's existence and consequently of the
God is the existence of all things. Consequently one who rationalizes that existence will rationalize all things. That existence is exactly the wisdom and the wise for itself. So the Necessary Being is the wise for itself and in-itself. His rationalizing of His own essence is the rationalizing of all things other than Him and His rationalization of His essence precedes all existences other than Him. As a result it was proved that the knowledge of the Necessary Being on all things exists in the stage of His essence before the existence of things other than Him, whether His known things be the intellectual forms based on His essence or be outside and detached from His essence. Thus this knowledge is a detailed perfect knowledge in one way and a non-detailed knowledge in another way.

This is because the things known with their multiplicity and detail in terms of meaning exist due to a unique simple existence, so in this divine and perpetual place of testimony all things, having no multiplicity, are revealed and evident. Thus He (the Exalted) in a unique manner is the “whole” (things)” (Shirazi, 1364, pp.269-71).

Allameh Tabatabaï’s opinion on God’s detailed knowledge of things

Allameh Tabatabaï in an exposition to the aforementioned argumentation of in Asfar has declared his reasoning for confirming God’s detailed knowledge founded on the principle “the simple reality is all things”. Allameh then rationalizes God’s detailed knowledge on another foundation which is the existential application that requires the presupposition of the necessity of an existence in-itself. This is counted as a new foundation and method in confirming God’s detailed knowledge (Kuchanani, 2005, p.54).

Allameh’s expression runs: “It is possible that the issue of God’s detailed knowledge of things in the status of essence be based on the necessary existential application of the presupposition of the necessity of an existence in-itself, because it is impossible that any given existence or existent be deprived of God’s existential encompassing. Thus He (the Exalted God) in the status of unlimited absolute essence possesses every existential perfection and His essence is present before His own essence because due to the true unity nothing is hidden from nothing and that is knowledge. Thus His knowledge of His essence is His exact knowledge of everything and that is desirable” (Tabatabaï, 1367, pp.269-270).

From what was explained so far, it can be concluded that the opinions
presence of materiality does not aggregate with the presence.

Secondly, being content with the detailed knowledge of things causes the Emanated Exalted essence be void of the knowledge in detail for each detailed perfection of things, whereas He is the very existence inclusive of every existential perfection to its highest and noblest degree (Kuchanani, 2005, p.53).

Sadr ul-Muta'alehin’s view on God’s detailed knowledge of things

In “Asfar”, Sadr ul-Muta'alehin after devising several principles, reasons God’s detailed knowledge of things on the basis of the principle “the simple reality”. The principles on which his reasoning is founded are as follow:

The first principle–Different meanings for various existences sometimes exist due to a single existence. For instance, the ultimate differentia for man which is the same as the logic and the human soul, because all of the concepts of substance, receptivity, the natural body, the sprouting, and sensible are existents in this human species due to the existence of the logic soul (p.264).

The second principle – whenever the existent is stronger in existence and more complete in being obtained, it has more encompassing on ideas with its simplicity and is more comprehensive regarding to the inclusiveness of miscellaneous perfections in things other than itself (p.267).

The third principle – The actualization of any typical idea in an existent and the application of that idea on that existent does not require that the existence of that existent be the existence of that idea, because the peculiar existence of a thing requires that due to that existence it be distinguished from the ideas external to its quiddity. As a result, for instance, the existence of man is not the existence of animal, even though it includes its (the man’s) definition and meaning. Likewise the existence of animal is not the existence of plant, even though it includes the animal’s definition and meaning (p.267).

The fourth principle – If some aspects of the existential perfections actualize in one of the existents, thus inevitably the basis of that perfection should be found in its cause to the utmost degree (ibid).

After devising the aforementioned principles, Sadr ul-Muta'alehin reasons as such: “The Exalted is the source of the effusion of all realities and quiddities, so it is necessary that His essence with His simplicity and uniqueness be the whole (of things)...... in that case the existence of
the soul of the objective existence of things is the authorized opinion of Shaykh Ishraq and his followers like Mohaqeq Toosi and the commentator of Talvihat and Allameh Shahrazuri (Ashtiani, 1354, p.91).

Mulla Sadra states in Sharh al-Hedayat al-Athiriah:

When the commentator of al-Isharat (Allameh Toosi) realized that the affirmation of forms in the essence of the Exalted God is an unorthodox opinion and an invalid school he violated it and discussed another way of amending the question of knowledge, whereas he had made a promise not to oppose Shaykh al-Re'is and if you, the reader, reflect profoundly on Khaje Toosi's manner, you will recognize that his manner is obtained from that of Shaykh Ishraq. (Shirazi, 1313, p.328)

On the difference of Khaje's opinion with that of Shaykh Ishraq, Mulla Sadra declares:

It is wonder that Allameh Toosi, in spite of contemplating on that firm and solid principle (Shaykh Ishraq's principle of knowledge) does not exert it completely in revealing all things emanated from the Exalted God. Rather in that principle he has confined himself to the revealing intellects and intellectual forms for universal and particular things for the Exalted God and has appointed the forms based on the intellectual substances as a basis for God's knowledge on materialities. (1354, p.106)

**The critique of Shaykh Ishraq's opinion**

In Sharh al-Hedayat al-Athiriah Mulla Sadra criticizes Shaykh Ishraq's argument as such:

It was definitely known that what has been mentioned in Ishraq's manner by him is one of the firmest arguments on the knowledge of the Exalted God. However, this argument has this shortcoming that if the basis of God's knowledge on things be the very existences of things and their appearances, there would be no knowledge of things for God in the stage of His essence, rather God's knowledge of things would be the mere relation and follower to His essence. (Shirazi, 1313, p.330)

Allameh Tabatabaii posits two problems with Shaykh Ishraq's opinion on God's knowledge of things: Firstly, Shaykh Ishraq's argument on the
knowledge of the forms of events. Also if there are forms in intellectual principles, they are present and apparent for God according to them. Its reason is that God’s knowledge of things is a relation, since His knowledge means thing’s being evident to Him, and appearance of a thing for a thing is a relation which occurs for one of them, and the lack of veil, which is the condition of vision, is negative. Because in the perception of the Exalted, the lack of veil is needed, nothing places Him in veil of something so that its negation be provisioned. What indicates that this is in- itself sufficient (in proving knowledge for God) is that verily vision occurs simply by the relation of the thing’s being evident to vision, along with the lack of veil. Thus, His relation to anything evident to Him is His vision and perception. The multiplicity of intellectual relations, which is in multiple things for God, does not imply multiplicity in His essence.

As mentioned, the multiplication of relations does not imply the multiplicity, since it implies a single relation which is the relation of originality that rectifies all relations. The transformation of relations does not imply the transformation of what is being related to, because by transition of what is in our right side to our left side, what changes is our relation to it not our essences in themselves. Likewise God’s knowledge of things, when it is an illuminative presence not due to a form in God’s essence, after nullification of the related thing, transformation does not occur in the Exalted God’s essence, i.e. if there is to be a “John Doe” (Zeyd) of whom God has knowledge by illuminative presence, the relation of originality to “John Doe” (Zeyd) becomes contingent for Him, and if “John Doe” (Zeyd) never remains, the relation of originality is nullified without any transformation in the essence of God.(Noorani and Mohaqeq, 1382, pp.350-351).

Allameh Tabatabaii comments on Shaykh Ishraq’s opinion as follows:

Shaykh Ishraq holds that things whether non-material or material are apparent for the Exalted God due to their concrete existence and are not hidden and veiled. This is His detailed knowledge of things after bringing them into existence. Thus, due to God’s knowledge of His essence, there is non-detailed knowledge of things for Him. (1367, p.329)

In this regard, Mulla Sadra writes: “Some of the scholars such as khaje Nasir al-Din Toosi have followed this opinion” (p.256). Also in al-Mabda’ val Ma’ad he states: “Holding that God’s knowledge of things is
Secondly – The hindrance of the existence of empirical knowledge in one who is non-material in essence and act is necessary.

Thirdly – This argument requires the actualization of a mental existence without an external existence to which it could be compared. It necessitates that there be another external existence for quiddity before its particular existence, which is detached from God. If considered carefully, this argumentation refers to the argument alleged to Plato (Kuchanani, 2005, p.51).

**Shaykh Ishraq’s opinion (549-587 A.H.) on God’s knowledge of things**

In “*Hikmat al-Ishraq*”, Shaykh Ishraq has argued:

His knowledge of His essence is His being a light in His essence and evident to His essence. His knowledge of things is their being evident to Him, either in themselves or in their connections, which are the locations where the higher managing lights continuously perceive them. That is a relation, and the lack of veil is negative. That this in itself is sufficient is indicated by the fact that vision occurs simply by the relation of the thing’s being evident to vision, along with the lack of any veil. Thus, the relation of the Necessary Existent to anything evident to Him is His vision and perception of that thing. The multiplication of intellectual relations does not imply multiplicity in His essence. (Walbridge and Ziai, 1999, p.382).

The exposition of Shaykh Ishraq’s argumentation, based on Qutb al-Din Shirazi’s commentary reads as such: verily God’s knowledge of His essence consists of His being which is luminous and evident to His essence. His knowledge of things is their being evident to Him through an illuminated presence and this presence for Him is either in themselves such as knowledge of the archetypes of the non-materials and materials and their subsistent forms in some heavenly spheres, or in their connections such as knowledge of the subsistent forms of the previous and future accidents in spherical souls. Because these forms of things, although not evident in themselves, are evident in their connections, which are the locations where the higher managing lights continuously perceive them, due to God’s illuminating, intuitive, apparent, and intrinsic knowledge of higher managing lights, which are the heavenly spheres, and due to His illuminating, intuitive, apparent, accidental
knowledge of things due to their emanation and existences in outside is not except their sole external attainments, and not in the attainments of their quiddities in the essence of the knower, whether be necessary or intellect or spherical soul.

Thus God’s knowledge of all things does not occur except for the presence of those things and the existence on whom they became existent and it doesn’t occur due to the attainment of the mental form in accordance with those things.

The third critique – Supposing that God’s knowledge is imprinted, the emanation of the multiplicity from a real unique is required from a single aspect because if the emanation of the first effect from the first source be conditioned to its form existed prior to it, as the Peripatetics’ formula requires, it necessitates that the first form be the cause for the attainment of the disparate consequent and for the attainment of other form i.e. the form of the second effect. Thus it necessitates that the Unique Truth due to single form and aspect perform two different actions.

Because the knowledge of others is uniquely due to form for Avicenna, in his book titled “al-Shifa”, we find him astonished in the discussion of this knowledge. Thus he sometimes argues that it is not permissible that the forms of all beings on whom the Necessary Being has knowledge, be in His essence, so that His unique essence wouldn’t multiply”. And sometimes he argues that forms of all existents which are the knowledge of the Necessary Being are in a domain of divinity. No one apprehend what this domain is in which the forms of all existents exist. Once he holds that these forms are in the unique essence of God without the necessity of multiplicity, because that is a multiplicity outside the essence and not within His reality.

When Allameh Toosi, the commentator of the book “Isharat”, realized this problem in shaykh’s argumentations (on God’s knowledge of things), that the affirmation of forms in the essence of the Exalted is an unorthodox opinion and an invalid school of thought,” he violated it and engaged in another method for reforming the issue of knowledge” (Shirazi, 1313, p.328).

**Allameh Tabataba’i’s critique of Avicenna’s opinion**

In Allameh Tabataba’i’s opinion the problems with Peripatetics’ views are as follow:

Firstly – This argument necessitates the hindrance of the lack of perfection in essence.
the necessities of essence are either mental or external for him or regardless of the two mental and external existences, they are His necessities. There is no way for accepting the first and the third supposition because except for a single type of existence nothing else could be imagined and that is an external existence which is the very reality of Him. The external necessities are nothing but external realities because concomitant follows concomitted, and this is against what we supposed because according to the mentioned supposition the obtained substances in the essence of the Exalted are mental substances. Likewise the obtained accidents in the essence are mental accidents (Kuchanani, 2005, p.51).

The second critique – The second critique requires some preliminaries:

The first preliminary – The complete knowledge of any existence is not acquired except for the mere presence of that type of existence for its knower, and not with the attainment of an instance of a thing. In other words, the attainment of the external existents in the mind is not like the attainment of these individuals because they are external; otherwise, it requires that an external existent, since it is external, be a mental existent.

The second preliminary – Influencing and being influenced and the causal relationship for Peripatetics’ followers is only in the species. This means that the cause due to its existence is of affairs which influences the effect due to its existence not because the quiddity of the cause due to its being quiddity with the lack of the subjective consideration of its existence, be the cause of the quiddity of the effect.

The third preliminary – The argumentation of Peripatetics which reads: “the complete knowledge of the complete cause leads to the complete knowledge of its effect” does not mean that knowledge of the quiddity of the complete cause, absolutely causes knowledge of the effect…. Rather, it means that knowledge of the complete cause on all of its reality which is along with that complete cause leads to the existence of its particular effect and causes knowledge of that effect.

After these three preliminaries, Mulla Sadra declares when the Necessary Being with its existence which is His exact essence is the complete cause of all existents with their order, and He considers His essence due to His mere existence which is by means of that cause, so it is necessary that He regards His effects due to their being His effects in such a way that they came into existence by God i.e. in terms of their being existent not in terms of their quiddities regardless of their existences. Since merely from this aspect, they did not emanate from Him without the subjective consideration of their existences. And the
thing solely in a general manner ("general here means the lack of transformation of knowledge due to the transformation of the object known") (Tabatabai, 1367, p.292). Meanwhile no individual thing and no particle in the heavens and the earth is hidden from him. "This is one of the wonders, the imagination of which needs a delicate talent", Avicenna asserts (1404, pp.358-359).

The quality of God’s knowledge of things is so that if the Necessary Being rationalizes His essence and reasons that He is the origin of every existent, He will rationalize that the prior existents (and the supreme causes of existence) and those born of them belong to Him (the Necessary Being). There is no thing that comes into existence unless it becomes necessary due to Him. These means in their contacts result in this matter that partial affairs come into existence from them. The Necessary Being who is the first cause of all existents, knows the causes and equivalences of those causes. As a result He, necessarily knows what those means leads to (the causes), what is between those means from times and what refers to, because it is impossible that He knows those means, but not those causes. Thus the Necessary Being is the perceiver of Partial principles since they are general. As the perception of partial eclipses (occurred in the present time and place) happens due to the encompassing all of its means and what is in the heaven (pp.360-362).

The Late Allameh Tabatabaii summarizes Avicenna’s opinion as such:

The Exalted God possesses an intuitive knowledge of His lofty essence and a detailed empirical knowledge of things before bringing them into existence, which has been yielded for Him through the presence of the quiddities of things according to the order which they have outside. The presence of these quiddities in His essence is not with their objective and particular existence; rather it is like a mental subsistence and in a general form. General here means the lack of transformation of knowledge due to transformation of the known object (and not in the sense of that concept whose veracity is not impossible on multiplicities). This God’s knowledge of things is nominated foreknowledge in which the objective attainment of the known object follows its scientific attainment. (1367, pp.291-292).

Mulla Sadra’s critique of Avicenna’s argumentation

The first critique – If God’s knowledge of things be due to the attainment of the forms of the things in His essence, then those forms of
Farabi’s opinion (d. about 340 A.H./950 A.D.)

According to Mulla Sadra’s report in Sharh al-Hedayat al-Athiriah, Farabi has stated in his book titled “Assiāsāt al-Madaniah” about God’s knowledge of things and of His own essence:

The Exalted God rationalizes His essence and that His essence is in a way that of all existents, because if the Exalted God rationalizes His essence, He would rationalize (all) the existents in a way, since other existents have obtained their existence from His. (Farabi, 1376, p.41)

Thus, for Farabi God’s knowledge of things is in a way the same as His knowledge of His own essence (Kuchanani, 2005, p.50).

Avicenna’s opinion (373-427 A.H.)

In Avicenna’s opinion God’s knowledge of things is an active knowledge, not passive, i.e. in His knowledge of things God is not influenced and impressed by forms yielded from the things before Himself, rather, since He knows about His essence which is the complete cause of the existents, is also the knower of other things.

In his book titled “Elahiāt al-shifa”, Avicenna argues that it is not permissible for the Necessary Being to rationalize things from things, otherwise His essence would be dependent and based on what He rationalizes, in that case the essence of the Necessary Being would be dependent on things, or the essence of things would resort to them for being rationalized. If so, the Necessary Being will not be the Necessary Being in every respect and this is impossible. And it would happen that if affairs were not out of the Necessary Being, He would not be knowledgeable and a state occurred for Him that was not essential for His essence, rather it was essential for things other than His essence. Consequently, something other than Him influenced Him, whereas this is vain. Since the Necessary Being is the origin of every existence, so due to His own essence He rationalizes for what He is the origin. The Necessary Being is the origin of prototypes of the complete existents and species of the variable existents and due to being the origin of species, is the origin of the individuals of those species.

It is not permissible for the Necessary Being to rationalize variables with their transformation, with a definite chronological intellect, in case that they are changeable. Rather the Necessary Being rationalizes each
In the Timaeus, Plato (347-427 B.C.) explicitly states that God or creator (Demiurge) forms the things of this world according to the model of Forms (or Ideas). In his book titled “A History of Philosophy”, Copleston writes: “This (Plato’s remarks in the Timaeus) implies that the Forms or Ideas exist apart, not only from the sensible things that are modeled on them, but also from God, who takes them as His model” (1985, p.67).

Mulla Sadra (979-1050 A.H.) quotes Plato’s remarks as follows: “The Exalted God’s knowledge of things is composed of the external forms dependent on their essences and detached from the Exalted God and from things. Those external forms are popularly the same as Platonic Ideas” (p. 91). The Late Allameh Tabatabai states: “Plato held that the detailed knowledge of the Exalted God is composed of non-mixed intellects and divine Ideas in which the accomplishments of species are congregated in detail.” (Tabatabaii, 1367, p.290).

**Mulla Sadra’s criticism of Plato’s argument**

Undoubtedly, those forms are objective existents not subjective, so we quote on the quality of the Exalted God’s knowledge of those objective forms prior to their bringing into existence. In that case, either infinite regress is required (i.e. God’s knowledge of those objective forms before their bringing into existence has been in other forms and knowledge of those objective forms before their existence again has been in other forms and this continues to the infinity) or this belief that some existents are being emanated from God without His knowledge of them (which necessitates the imperfection of God’s being ignorant) (Kuchanani, 2005, p.50).

Allameh Tabatabaii’s criticism of Plato’s argument is as follows:

The problem of this hypothesis is that Plato’s opinion expresses the knowledge after bringing into existence which is in the stage of the possible existents and confining God’s detailed knowledge of things in the stage of possible existents necessitates evacuation of the Exalted essence in the status of His essence of scientific perfection, whereas God is a mere existent, out of whom no perfection of existential perfections exists. (Tabatabaii, 1367, p.290)
which states that all objects including non-material and material things are present before God and this is the detailed knowledge of things (Tabatabaii, 1417, p.165); Avicenna and the Peripatetics’ saying who believe that God’s knowledge of things and their establishment in the presence of things in accordance with the existing system in being, is for God’s essence not like the penetration in essence and union with it, but like the dependence of quiddities on essence like the mental subsistence in a general manner (general means the lack of transformation of knowledge due to the lack of transformation of the things known; the most recent generations who believe that God’s knowledge of His own essence is the non-detailed knowledge of things, the Exalted God, due to His knowledge of His essence, knows about all things in general, but His knowledge of things in detail occurs after bringing them into being, because knowledge follows the known object and there is not any known object prior to its existence (p.166); Sadr ul-Muta'alehin’s argument which believes that the knowledge of the Exalted is the intuitive knowledge of His own essence and God possesses an intuitive detailed knowledge of things in the stage of His essence before bringing them into being, and that knowledge is His very essence. He possesses the intuitive detailed knowledge of things in the stage of things which is out of His essence (p.164).

Sadr ul-Muta'alehin, with the application of objectivism, subjective quiddity, establishing various ideas for a unique existence, holding two types of external and mental existences for ideas and quiddity, unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, and the principle of simple reality, with an interdisciplinary approach tries to solve many-sided problems. He also has a historical approach in this problem-solving. By recognizing the predecessor in the light of the successor and by challenging the ideas of predecessors, he makes an attempt to obtain a view in order to solve the problem.

The hypothesis of this research is that the rival standpoints such as the views of Mu'tazelites, Sufis, Shaykh Ishraq, Plato, Avicenna, and Allameh Tabatabaii deserve consideration and criticism. And finally we want to conclude that the opinions of Sadr ul-Muta'alehin and Allameh Tabatabaii are defensible and demonstrable.

**Different ideas on God’s knowledge of things**

Different ideas have been proposed by philosophers on God's knowledge of things:
Necessary Being of all things is actualized in the stage of His essence before the existence of those things. Allameh Tabatabaïi rationalizes the detailed knowledge of God by the existential application of God which is essential for the assumption of necessity of the existence in itself.

Keywords: Detailed Knowledge, God, Plato, Avicenna, Shaykh Ishraq, Mulla Sadra, Allameh Tabatabaïi, the complete cause, attainment, forms.

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Statement of the problem

God’s knowledge is one of the very ancient issues in philosophy and speculative theology and one of the most complex divine problems (Zonuzi, 1361, p.342); hence it is one of the controversial issues in philosophy and speculative theology. This issue is one of the interdisciplinary issues which is composed of the philosophy of religion, theology, speculative theology, mysticism, philosophy, and commentary. Some people denied God’s knowledge of His essence and of other things. Their pretext is that knowledge is the relation between the knower and the known, and the actualization of the knowledge of essence requires the refusal of the knowledge of other things too (p.302/ Sabzevari, 1412, p.572). Some people have accepted God’s knowledge of His essence; however, they denied God’s Knowledge of things in eternity, because they did not regard existence for things in eternity.

The nullification of the first saying is that the intuitive knowledge of a thing on its essence and the mentally - positedness of inconsistency will not require the actualization of two sides in the essence of God (p.572). The nullification of the second saying is that knowledge of cause in eternity requires knowledge of effect in eternity, although the effect would not have been in eternity (p.573).

The maintainers of God’s knowledge of things include several groups, the most important of which are: The Mu’tazelit school which considers God’s knowledge to be of subsistent quiddities in eternity; the Sufi’s saying such as Mohyeddin Arabi and his followers who consider God’s knowledge to be the immutable realities necessary for the names of God in the unity status; Plato’s argument which regards God’s knowledge to be similar to a light, detached from God’s essence and prior to the existence of things (Cornford, 1956, p.1839); Shaykh Ishraq’s discussion
Mulla Sadra and God’s Detailed Knowledge of Things

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Abstract
Plato maintained that God’s knowledge of things consisted of self-existent external forms, i.e. Ideas. Plato’s belief has been criticized by Mulla Sadra and others. Avicenna believes since God is the knower of His own essence which is the complete cause of things, He is the knower of things. His knowledge of things is a general knowledge and general, in this sense, means lack of transformation of knowledge in accordance with the transformation of known object.
The philosophers after Avicenna criticized him, because his belief necessitates the obstacle of the evacuation of the essence of God from perfection and the dread of subsistence of the empirical knowledge is essential for one who is by essence and act non-material. Shaykh Isbraaq maintains that things, whether material or non-material, are present for God, the Exalted, by their own concrete existence.
There are also criticisms on Shaykh Isbraaq’s notion, among them is that his opinion on the presence of material things is prohibited for God, the Exalted, because materiality and presence do not aggregate. Sadr-ul-Muta’alehin has affirmed the detailed knowledge of God through the principle of “simple reality is all things” i.e. the knowledge of the

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