عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
One of the most important, and at the same time, popular discussions within the realm of epistemology in the last five decades, is about the issue of “the nature of knowledge”. According to the current accepted view among epistemologists, there would be no “propositional knowledge” if there exist no “true believing”. So S knows p, only if S is in th state of having true belief that p. Epistemologists' conception of true proposition and true belief, and accordingly knowledge, is result of a semantic and epistemic notion void of any pragmatic element or condition. In this paper, I try to show that this conception is not correct, and knowledge is not only a matter of semantics and epistemology but further it is subjected to pragmatic considerations. For propositions, as the content of our de re/de dicto beliefs, and their truth or falsity, are dependent upon pragmatics and its psycho-social principles.