Ali Akbar Ahmadi Aframjani; Ahmad Rahmanian
Abstract
This paper examines Nelson Goodman’s position on the ontological problem of value of art, in other words, the question of ‘what kind is the relation between valuable feature(s) of artworks to them, in Goodman’s aesthetic cognitivism. In the first place, by examining several issues ...
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This paper examines Nelson Goodman’s position on the ontological problem of value of art, in other words, the question of ‘what kind is the relation between valuable feature(s) of artworks to them, in Goodman’s aesthetic cognitivism. In the first place, by examining several issues about (1) the types of the relations between valuable feature of an object to it, (2) the types of the relations between valuable feature of a work to it, and (3) Goodman’s position on the normative problem of value of art, provides the rudiments to solve the above question. In the next place, it suggests that although Goodman is a cognitivist, in the normative issue of value of art, and cognitivism is an anti-essentialism position, it is not that his anti-essentialism is entirely consistent with cognitivists’ anti-essentialism. Goodman and cognitivists are partners in the beliefs that cognitive value attributed to art is (1) plural and (2) is not unique to art. But, do not share the biliefs that (3) the value is common in all works of art and (4) the relation between the value to artworks is intrinsic. However, he does not violate anti-essentialism, although 3 and 4 makes him close to essentialism, Because Goodman’s common cognitive value is not unique to works of art.
gholamhoseyn tavakoli
Abstract
Moral Error Theory was formulated by J. L. Mackie and later modified and supported by other scholars, including Richard Joyce. The theory has been so influential that some authorities consider new realism of late 20th century a response to Moral Error Theory and an attempt to resolve the dilemmas Mackie ...
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Moral Error Theory was formulated by J. L. Mackie and later modified and supported by other scholars, including Richard Joyce. The theory has been so influential that some authorities consider new realism of late 20th century a response to Moral Error Theory and an attempt to resolve the dilemmas Mackie created for the moral objectivists. In other words, followers of this theory believe that all moral propositions, while descriptive of truth, are false, for the truth they refer to does not exist in the outside world. It has both positive and negative aspects. Its negative aspect is related To ontology or moral metaphysics. In this regard, the supporters of Moral Error Theory reject the existence of moral facts. Its positive aspect is, in fact, its semantic and linguistic aspect; the moral facts are said to refer to real affairs, moral sentences are descriptive, and the language of morals is used to serve this purpose. Caught between Realism and Non-Realism, Moral Error Theory, thus, takes the middle stance; it accepts the value of moral sentences in the same way as Realists do. On the other side, it rejects objective moral facts in the same manner as Moral Non-Realism does.
